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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the last several years, criminal justice reform has been a pressing 
political topic, and radical proposals to overhaul the criminal justice 
system have gained traction.1 Nearly all of the candidates in the crowded 
2020 Democratic presidential primary field introduced comprehensive 
proposals to curb (or even eliminate) mass incarceration.2 The reasons for 
this new-found political interest in dramatic criminal justice reform are 
varied and complex, but we can be certain shifting public opinion on the 
cause and consequences of mass incarceration played some part.3 But why 
has the public’s view of mass incarceration so dramatically shifted? 
Undoubtedly, public information campaigns and social justice 
movements have provided the average American more information about 
the historical and present-day realities of the American criminal justice 
system.4 Studies have found that the more information provided to the 
average American citizen, the more likely they are to support reforms.5 
But despite this growing interest in criminal justice reform, prisons 
remain “the black boxes of our society,”6 leaving the public struggling to 
understand what exactly goes on behind prison walls. Intrepid journalists 
seeking to shed some light on what goes on behind the walls of the 
thousands of prisons dotting the American landscape have published 
important exposés in recent years,7 but the voices of incarcerated persons 
*Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Special thanks to Ciara
Anderson, J.D. ‘20, for her invaluable research assistance.  
1. See, e.g., Timothy Williams & Thomas Kaplan, The Criminal Justice Debate Has Changed 




4. Examples of such public information campaigns and movements include: Stop Solitary
Campaign, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/stop-solitary-advocacy-campaign-tools [https://
perma.cc/69PT-ZHKT]; Prison Gerrymandering Project, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/, [https://perma.cc/HR7N-JT6A]; Prison Phone Justice, HUM. 
RIGHTS DEFENSE CTR., http://www.prisonphonejustice.org [https://perma.cc/ED39-KCD2]; PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/09/29/state-reform-phones/) 
[https://perma.cc/FBE3-QGXU]; The State of Justice Reform 2018, VERA, 
https://www.vera.org/state-of-justice-reform/2018/the-state-of-bail [https://perma.cc/N2SB-8EKE].  
5. Memorandum from Danny Franklin & Benenson Strategy Group on Criminal Justice
System Survey Results to Interested Parties, (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/report/smart-
justice-campaign-polling-americans-attitudes-criminal-justice-topline-memo 
[https://perma.cc/E57Z-AB9H]. 
6. Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the Violence of Incarceration, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/inside-americas-black-
box.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/5J52-SYNA]. 
7. See, e.g., Aviva Stahl, Force-Feeding Is Cruel, Painful, and Degrading—and American
Prisons Won’t Stop, NATION (June 4, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/force-feeding-prison-
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can often be lost in the conversation.8 Recognizing this loss, certain 
journalistic outlets have made a concerted effort in recent years to publish 
pieces written by those living inside the walls.9 Hearing the voices and 
stories of those living inside the system is crucially important to 
understanding the flaws of the criminal justice system and exposing illegal 
conditions of confinement.10 This is particularly true for those institutions 
that are either notoriously opaque11 or infamously brutal.12 But despite the 
supermax-torture/ [https://perma.cc/7Q4G-7YMH] (describing the force-feeding tactics utilized on 
prisoners engaging in hunger strikes at the nation’s federal supermax); Jennifer Gonnerman, Do Jails 
Kill People?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/do-
jails-kill-people [https://perma.cc/GW6Z-6ZC6] (noting that the well-known New York City jail on 
Rikers Island “has long been notorious for its culture of brutality”); Annie Correal, No Heat for Days 
at a Jail in Brooklyn Where Hundreds of Inmates Are Sick and ‘Frantic’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/nyregion/mdc-brooklyn-jail-heat.html 
[https://perma.cc/4RVN-RQP8] (recounting the experience of federal detainees “stuck in freezing 
cells” with little to no power or heat for at least a week); German Lopez, America’s prisoners are 
going on strike in at least 17 states, VOX (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/17/176640
48/national-prison-strike-2018 [https://perma.cc/TE5R-7BCM] (describing the work and hunger 
strike planned by prisoners across the country from August 21 to September 9, 2018); Shane Bauer, 
My Four Months as a Private Prison Guard: A Mother Jones Investigation, MOTHER JONES 
(July/August 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/cca-private-prisons-corrections-
corporation-inmates-investigation-bauer/ [https://perma.cc/NW9K-EMQZ] (describing cells that 
look like tombs, guards using force on a prisoner who just had open-heart surgery as “all part of the 
bid’ness,” and the reporter’s own priorities changing as “[s]triving to treat everyone as human takes 
too much energy.”); Mark Binelli, Inside America’s Toughest Federal Prison, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/magazine/inside-americas-toughest-federal-
prison.html [https://perma.cc/S4EB-ZB38] (recounting tales of self-mutilation, psychosis, and suicide 
at the federal supermax prison, where all prisoners are held in solitary confinement). 
8. This lack of input from the persons living inside prison can often be attributed to lack of
media access to prisoners. 
9. See, e.g., Life Inside, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/tag/life-
inside [https://perma.cc/CJ5Y-Z336] (a weekly newsletter delivering “first-person essays from those 
who work or live in the criminal justice system,” including prisoners); Voices from Solitary, 
SOLITARY WATCH, https://solitarywatch.org/category/voices/ [https://perma.cc/S6HR-P6KB] 
(featuring first-person pieces from those suffering in solitary confinement in the nation’s prisons and 
jails).  
10. See generally Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal
Supermax: Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 460–64 (discussing the 
invisibility of prisons as compared to the other aspects of the criminal justice system); Andrea 
Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. 
J.L. & POL’Y 435, 462–66 (2014) (discussing the lack of transparency of penal institutions). 
11. See, e.g., Jeanne Theoharis, I Tried to Tell the World About Epstein’s Jail. No One Wanted 
to Listen, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/real-
scandal-mcc/596257/?utm_source=atl&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=share 
[https://perma.cc/H5EA-2QEP] (discussing the “hidden in plain sight” horrors of the federal prison 
system and the difficulty of investigating those conditions); Rovner, supra note 10, at 464 (discussing 
the invisibility of the federal supermax-the United States Penitentiary-Administrative Maximum 
(ADX)). 
12. Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the Violence of Incarceration, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/inside-americas-black-
3
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effort to feature incarcerated voices by some news organizations, the 2.2 
million people currently confined to American prisons and jails are largely 
out of sight and mind for most of the public.13 
This lack of visibility is purposeful and is perpetuated by a lack of 
independent monitoring of prisons and jails14 and by the leniency afforded 
to prison systems by the federal courts.15 In 2006, the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons released a report documenting 
troubling conditions in the nation’s prisons and jails and calling for an 
independent, external monitor of prison systems in order to increase 
transparency and accountability in the nation’s carceral institutions.16 
Every public institution—hospitals, schools, police departments, and 
prisons and jails—needs and benefits from strong oversight. Perhaps 
more than other institutions, correctional facilities require vigorous scru-
tiny: They are uniquely powerful institutions, depriving millions of peo-
ple each year of liberty and taking responsibility for their security, yet 
are walled off from the public.17 
Without an external system of checking their power, prison systems 
across the country are free to operate with little transparency and 
accountability.18 This lack of external accountability allows prison 
systems to become “a place that is so foreign to the culture of the real 
box.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/8EWZ-WPKQ] (describing photographs 
received by the New York Times of weapons and bloody crime scenes inside the St. Clair Correctional 
Facility in Alabama); Gonnerman, supra note 7 (noting that the well-known New York City jail on 
Rikers Island “has long been notorious for its culture of brutality.”); Matthew Teague, ‘It’s a 
bloodbath’: staff describe life inside America’s most violent prison, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/21/holman-prison-alabama-guard-speaks-out 
[https://perma.cc/6AX6-FEWF] (describing “[t]he horrors of Holman penitentiary in southern 
Alabama—the stabbings, riots, fires, abuse—[that] have earned it a reputation as the most violent 
prison in the United States.”).  
13. Dewan, supra note 12. 
14. Human Rights Watch, No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United
States, at 3 (Jun. 2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0609web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AH4E-PKBZ] (“Unlike many other democracies, the United States has no independent 
national agency that monitors conditions in prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities and enforces minimal 
standards of health, safety, and humane treatment.”). 
15. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (announcing reasonable relationship
standard as governing all challenges to prison regulations). 
16. Vera Institute of Justice, Confronting Confinement: A Report of the Commission on Safety 
and Abuse in America’s Prisons, at 15–16, 21–22 (2006), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-
assets/downloads/Publications/confronting-
confinement/legacy_downloads/Confronting_Confinement.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN6R-6VFT] 
(“Corrections leaders work hard to oversee their own institutions and hold themselves accountable, 
but their vital efforts are not sufficient and cannot substitute for external forms of oversight.”).  
17. Id. at 77. 
18. Id. at 16. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss2/1
2019] SUFFRAGIST PRISONERS 283 
world” that any attempts to self-police flatly fail, and prison officials are 
placed under extreme pressure to “keep quiet” about any obvious 
problems.19 
Without appropriate external oversight, public accountability of 
prison systems often occurs only in those rare instances where a prisoner 
successfully challenges a condition of his incarceration in federal court.20 
But a 1987 Supreme Court decision severely limits the First Amendment 
rights of prisoners.21 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court embedded 
into prisoner First Amendment jurisprudence a requirement that federal 
courts defer to the professional judgment of prison officials when 
considering whether a prison regulation violates a prisoner’s 
constitutional rights.22 In theory, this deference should not be absolute, 
but, in practice, Turner deference has allowed prison officials to abuse the 
discretion afforded them under the doctrine.23 Therefore, prisoner speech 
is subjected to a high-level of censorship that limits the ability of prisoners 
to protest or otherwise expose inhumane conditions of confinement. 
Indeed, those prisoners who engage in such protected activity are often 
subjected to retaliation, which further chills their willingness to speak out 
against the abusive practices of their jailers. 
This Article argues for increased protections for prisoners who 
choose to protest the conditions of their incarceration. By strengthening 
the protections afforded to prisoner protests, I submit that federal courts 
can increase the accountability of prison officials and further the 
democratic and societal values embedded in the First Amendment’s free 
speech protections. To advance this argument, I’ve chosen to use the acts 
of protest utilized by the Silent Sentinels—the women jailed because of 
their protest activities in support of the Nineteenth Amendment—as an 
example demonstrating why in-prison protest is worthy of robust 
constitutional protections. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, I provide the historical 
background necessary to understand the utility of the Silent Sentinels 
19. Id. at 79, 82. 
20. Id. at 22. 
21. See generally Turner, 482 U.S. 78. 
22. Id. at 84–85 (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province 
of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task 
that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns 
counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . 
additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”). 
23. David M. Shapiro, Lenient in Theory, Dumb in Fact: Prison, Speech, and Scrutiny, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972, 995 (2016) (recounting how “corrections officials abuse, with some 
frequency, the discretion granted to them by Turner and its progeny”). 
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example. This discussion includes a description of the conditions of the 
prison in which the Silent Sentinels were incarcerated, an account of the 
type of protest speech utilized by the Silent Sentinels from within prison, 
and an explanation of the consequences of the women’s protest activity. 
From there, Part II provides an analysis of the law governing prisoner 
protest activity when viewed through the lens of free speech, including a 
thorough discussion of the Turner standard and the limitations placed on 
prisoner protest activities because of that standard. Part II then examines 
the compelling critiques of the Turner standard articulated by other 
scholars and introduces the argument that more robust protections of 
prisoner protest activities are both possible and necessary. Finally, the 
Article argues that the example of the Silent Sentinels provides a 
compelling lens through which one can examine the utility of protecting 
prisoner protest rights. Part III begins by critically analyzing the utility of 
the Silent Sentinels example and cataloguing anticipated critiques to using 
this lens through which to argue for change in the current criminal justice 
system. By examining how the Silent Sentinels’ in-prison protest 
furthered critical First Amendment values, Part III concludes by 
comparing the Silent Sentinels’ protest to modern prisoner protest 
activities and arguing that the Silent Sentinels’ experience demonstrates 
why we should support robust protections of prisoner protest rights. 
II. THE SILENT SENTINELS
On January 10, 1917, a group of women organized by Alice Paul, 
Lucy Burns, and the National Woman’s Party (NWP) began a two-and-a-
half-year protest in support of women’s suffrage.24 The first group of 
American citizens to picket the White House, a dozen women gathered 
outside the White House gates on that January day, carrying purple, white, 
and gold banners.25 Some of the banners read, “Mr. President, what will 
you do for women’s suffrage?,” while others stated “How long must 
women wait for liberty?”26 Causing a “profound stir” on that first day, the 
picketers returned to protest six days a week for the next several months 
and then more sporadically until June 4, 1919, when Congress passed the 
Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.27 
24. DORIS STEVENS, JAILED FOR FREEDOM: AMERICAN WOMEN WIN THE VOTE 21 (Carol
O’Hare, ed., 1995). 
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The picketing women became known as “Silent Sentinels” because, 
while the women held “banners with provocative political slogans or 
demanding the right to vote,”28 they stood in peaceful silence.29 While the 
New York Times initially called the picketers “unladylike and ‘silly,’” 
most other news organizations lauded the women’s efforts.30 “Taking a 
shift as a sentinel was much harder work than it might appear. The pickets 
stood outside no matter what the weather, feet frozen and hands numb 
from holding the heavy banners, subject to taunts from young boys and 
bemused stares from passerby.”31 While the taunts and stares may have 
been uncomfortable for the picketers, the protests remained largely 
peaceful for the first several months.32 In fact, President Wilson initially 
seemed “amused and interested” at the women posted outside the White 
House.33 
But the President’s toleration of the picketers quickly changed after 
the United States entered World War I in April 1917.34 The suffragist 
members of the NWP resolved to continue their work despite the war 
effort, “being unalterably convinced that in so doing the organization 
serves the highest interests of the country.”35 The decision to continue 
picketing despite the United States’ entry into the war cost the NWP a 
sizable portion of its membership, but the strategy “succeeded in keeping 
the suffrage cause at the center of public debate.”36 
The picketers remained determined to underscore the hypocrisy of 
President Wilson’s championing of democracy around the world while 
denying democratic participation to half of the American citizenry.37 To 
28. Id. at 21. 
29. Rivera Sun, Silent Sentinels Start Suffrage Protest on Jan 10th, 1917, RIVERA SUN (Jan. 8, 
2016), http://www.riverasun.com/silent-sentinels-start-suffrage-protest-on-jan-10th-1917/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZWK-R8HL]. 
30. Lynda G. Dodd, Parades, Pickets, and Prison: Alice Paul and the Virtues of Unruly
Constitutional Citizenship, 24 J.L. & POL. 339, 398 (2008) (quoting Editorial, Silent, Silly, Offensive, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1917, at 4) (other citations omitted). 
31. SUSAN WARE, WHY THEY MARCHED: UNTOLD STORIES OF THE WOMEN WHO FOUGHT 
FOR THE RIGHT TO VOTE 242 (2019). 
32. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 59–66. 
33. Id. at 61 (“Perhaps he thought it a trifling incident staged by a minority of the radical
suffragists and anticipated no popular support for it. When he saw their persistence through a cruel 
winter his sympathy was touched. He ordered the guards to invite them for a cup of hot coffee, which 
they declined. He raised his hat to them as he drove through the line. Sometimes he smiled. As yet he 
was not irritated. He was confident in his national power.”). 
34. Id. at 67. 
35. Dodd, supra note 30, at 398 (quoting CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI, FROM EQUAL SUFFRAGE 
TO EQUAL RIGHTS: ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY, 1910–1928, at 111–12 
(1991)). 
36. Dodd, supra note 30, at 401 n. 264. 
37. Id. at 400. 
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this end, the suffragists created banners meant to embarrass the Wilson 
administration whenever it hosted a foreign envoy at the White House.38 
This embarrassment reached a tipping point in June 1917, when a Russian 
envoy visited the White House.39 Seeking to harken on the sentiments of 
the Russian Revolution,40 the suffragists arrived at the White House on 
June 20, 1917 with a banner stating: 
To the Russian Envoys, we the women of America tell you that America 
is not a democracy. Twenty million American women are denied the 
right to vote. President Wilson is the chief opponent of their national 
enfranchisement. Help us make this nation really free. Tell our govern-
ment it must liberate its people before it can claim free Russia as an 
ally.41 
An angry passerby tore down this banner, and the next day a group of boys 
destroyed a second, similar banner.42 On each occasion, police looked on 
without interference.43 The peaceful nature of the White House protest 
thereafter changed, and “the local police, apparently with the tacit support 
of the Wilson administration, started arresting and jailing picketers for 
disorderly conduct and obstructing sidewalk traffic, even though they 
were doing nothing differently than they had for the past six months.”44 
Local police made the first arrests on June 22, 1917, arresting Lucy 
Burns and Katherine Morey.45 The next day brought more arrests, but 
officials in the District of Columbia dismissed each of the cases arising 
from these initial arrests, and the women were never tried.46 On June 26, 
1917, however, local officials arrested six women for “obstructing the 
traffic,” tried them, and sentenced them to a 25 dollar fine.47 After the 
women refused to pay the fine, the court sentenced them to three days in 
jail.48 Several arrests followed a similar pattern, and “by October 1917, 
seventy women were arrested, six of them for terms as long as six 
38. Id. (“In one of Wilson’s speeches, often quoted on suffrage banners, Wilson declared: ‘We 
shall fight for the things which we have always held nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right 
of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments.’”); see also STEVENS, 
supra note 24, at 74. 
39. Id. at 73. 
40. WARE, supra note 31, at 244. 
41. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 74. 
42. Id.; WARE, supra note 31, at 244. 
43. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 74. 
44. WARE, supra note 31, at 244. 
45. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 76; Dodd, supra note 30, at 404. 
46. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 76. 
47. Id.
48. Dodd, supra note 30, at 404. 
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months.”49 The District of Columbia sent the women to the Occoquan 
Workhouse in Virginia and the District Jail to serve their sentences. Once 
incarcerated, the women courageously continued their protests from 
behind prison walls, calling attention not just to the unjust nature of their 
imprisonment, but also the squalid and miserable conditions of the 
prisons. 
A. The Occoquan Workhouse in Virginia and the District Jail 
Workhouses arose as a place of punishment in Europe in the late 
sixteenth century.50 The workhouse regime revolved around forced labor, 
wherein prisoners worked ten-to-twelve hour days (with Sundays reserved 
for religious worship) and produced a certain fixed output of product.51 
By the Victorian era in England, workhouses had transformed into places 
for the destitute rather than for felons.52 These workhouses were 
institutions of “strict control” and imposed a “harsh disciplinary 
regime,”53 with conditions meant to deter inhabitants from returning (e.g., 
unpalatable food provided in only minimal amounts, hard labor, shameful 
uniforms, and boards rather than beds for sleep).54 
Built in 1910, the Occoquan Workhouse reflected a more 
rehabilitative, rather than deterrent, ideal than its European counterparts.55 
In contrast to their counterparts confined in the penitentiary, prisoners in 
the workhouse worked in trades meant to further their reform.56 The 
Women’s Workhouse at Occoquan opened in 1912; it confined “poor 
women of color, imprisoned for crimes such as disorderly conduct and 
49. WARE, supra note 31, at 245. There are conflicting accounts as to how many women were 
arrested as a result of the picketing movement. See, e.g., JOHANNA NEUMAN, GILDED SUFFRAGISTS: 
THE NEW YORK SOCIALITES WHO FOUGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHT TO VOTE 129 (2017) (“By the time 
all were released in November, by one estimate 2,000 American women had joined the protest line, 
500 had been arrested, and 170 have been jailed for demanding the right to vote.”). 
50. Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 45, 61 (Norval 
Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
51. Id. at 64. 
52. Seán McConville, The Victoria Prison: England, 1865–1965, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 117 (Norval Morris & David J. 
Rothman eds., 1995). 
53. Patricia O’Brien, The Prison on the Continent, Europe, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 178, 182 (Norval 
Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995). 
54. McConville, supra note 52, at 28. 
55. Wilson Korges, The Lasting Legacy of Suffragists at the Lorton Women’s Workhouse, 
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prostitution. The women of the workhouse did laundry for the facility, 
while others worked in the gardens.”57 
In contrast to its rehabilitative ideal, the actual conditions of the 
Occoquan Workhouse likened to the conditions of the Victorian-era 
workhouses in England: the women confined there “were subjected to 
inedible food, humiliating treatment, lack of communication with the 
outside world, and—especially on the infamous ‘Night of Terror’ on 
November 15, 1917—physical intimidation and violence from prison 
authorities.”58 Prison officials withheld the prisoners’ mail from them, fed 
them food with worms in it, and gave them blankets that had not been 
washed or cleaned for a year.59 
The Occoquan prison officials also subjected the women confined 
there to ruthless forms of punishment.60 The prison superintendent and his 
son beat the women, and prison officials punished certain prisoners by 
limiting their food to only bread and water.61 Prison officials exploited 
pre-existing racial tensions by forcing women of one race to brutally 
attack women of another race, threatening punishment to those who 
refused.62 Women who disobeyed prison rules often were subjected to a 
form of punishment known as “the greasy pole:”63 
This method of punishment consisted of strapping girls with their hands 
tied behind them to a greasy pole from which they were partly sus-
pended. Unable to keep themselves in an upright position, because of 
the grease on the pole, they slipped almost to the floor, with their arms 
all but severed from the arm sockets, suffering intense pain for long pe-
riods of time.64 
The conditions at the District Jail where some prisoners would spend 
some or all of their sentences were not much better than those at 
Occoquan. While the workhouse—aside from the solitary confinement 
cells—consisted mostly of open barracks, the District Jail, built in the 
1870s, held conventional cells that measured six-by-nine feet, such that 
the women could touch each side with their fingertips with their arms 
outstretched.65 Frequently, the jail officials confined the women two to a 
57. Id. 
58. WARE, supra note 31, at 246. The “Night of Terror” is described in more detail below. See 
infra at I.B. 
59. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 96. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 99. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. J.D. ZHANISER & AMELIA R. FRY, ALICE PAUL: CLAIMING POWER 282 (2014). 
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cell, and prison officials responded to the slightest disobedience by 
placing the women in solitary confinement.66 The tiny cells were infested 
with vermin, including rats and bed bugs, and each cell contained an open 
toilet, which, when combined with the prison’s practice of closing the 
workhouse windows from late afternoon until morning, created a stifling 
environment.67 
Despite these conditions and the risk of further torturous 
punishments, the conviction of the Silent Sentinels did not waiver, and 
they continued their protests from within prison walls. 
B. The Silent Sentinels’ In-Prison Protests 
The very fact of the first sentences to Occoquan caused quite a stir, 
and one should not underestimate how the imprisonment of sixteen 
“leading suffragists and very well-connected women” helped garner 
immediate public support for the women and their cause.68 There can be 
no doubt that the arrests’ efficacy in furthering the suffrage movement is 
tied to the wealth and elite status of the women suddenly labelled 
prisoners.69 Indeed, the wealth and status of the prisoners’ husbands 
certainly furthered the outrage that followed the initial arrests, and 
President Wilson’s quick pardon of the first group of women sentenced 
was in part driven by racist news coverage heralding the women’s courage 
in coping with Occoquan’s integrated environment.70 
But, no matter their social status and background, the introduction to 
Occoquan’s conditions did little to stem the conviction of the picketers, 
and by August 17, 1917, more picketers were arrested and sentenced to 
Occoquan.71 No pardon followed these arrests or the others that ensued in 
the forthcoming weeks.72 Garnering no special treatment at the prison, the 
suffragist prisoners lived in and with conditions of “poor sanitation, 
infested food, and dreadful facilities:”73 
At first, the suffragist prisoners abide[d] by the routine of the institution, 
66. Id. at 282–83. 
67. Id. 
68. Dodd, supra note 30, at 405. 
69. Id. (“One was a daughter of a former ambassador and secretary of state. Another was the
wife of a Progressive Party leader. Others were noted society figures, relatives of politicians, and 
high-ranking members of the NWP.”). 
70. Id. at 407 n.299. 
71. Id. at 408. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 411. 
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disagreeable and unreasonable as it was. They performed the tasks as-
signed to them. They ate the prison food without protest. They wore the 
coarse prison clothes. But at the end of the first week of detention they 
became so weak from the shockingly bad food that they began to wonder 
if they could endure a diet of sour bread, half-cooked vegetables, and 
rancid soup with worms in it.74 
As it became clear that the arrested suffragists would face longer and 
longer terms of imprisonment, the women moved the protest inside the 
prison walls. 
Claiming to be political prisoners, the women sought to intensify the 
pressure the picketing placed on the Wilson Administration by 
highlighting the injustice of their plight.75 Lucy Burns began “quietly 
organizing within Occoquan for several weeks to circulate a petition 
among the imprisoned suffragists.”76 Learning of her activities, the 
Occoquan officials placed Miss Burns in solitary confinement.77 But her 
fellow suffragist prisoners carried on, completing the petition as their first 
in-prison protest action; the petition announced a prison work strike and 
requested that prison officials treat the women as political prisoners, 
making it “the first organized group action ever made in America to 
establish the status of political prisoners.”78 
In addition to the strike announcement and the request to be treated 
as political prisoners, the petition listed several other demands: (1) that 
the suffragists be allowed to congregate together and that Lucy Burns be 
released from solitary confinement; (2) that the suffragists be afforded the 
opportunity to meet with their lawyers; (3) that the suffragists be allowed 
to receive food from the outside; and (4) that the suffragists be provided 
writing materials and books, letters, and newspapers.79 The petition also 
explained that the suffragists did not immediately create the petition 
“because on entering the workhouse [they] found conditions so very bad 
that before we could ask the suffragists be treated as political prisoners, it 
was necessary to make a stand for the ordinary rights of human beings for 
all the [prisoners].”80 After garnering signatures, the suffragists smuggled 
the petition out to the district commissioners.81 
74. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 95. 
75. Id. at 105. 
76. Dodd, supra note 30, at 411. 
77. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 107. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 107–08. 
80. Id. at 108. 
81. Dodd, supra note 30, at 411. 
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In response, the commissioners quickly transferred Lucy Burns and 
the other signatories to the district jail, placing all of them in solitary 
confinement.82 The cells in which the women were confined had no fresh 
air—the windows were locked tight, and any woman who attempted to 
open one was physically thrown into a solitary cell.83 The jail served food 
no better than the food provided at Occoquan, and the women existed on 
bread, water, and occasionally molasses.84 On November 5, 1917, Alice 
Paul began a hunger strike to protest the women’s treatment.85 To Paul 
and those who joined her, the hunger strike was “the ultimate form of 
protest left.”86 Rather than heed the demands of the suffragists, however, 
the jail administrators began force-feeding the hunger strikers.87 
In response to the force-feeding, suffragists on the outside increased 
the number of picketers at the White House, leading to their arrest and 
eventual sentence to Occoquan.88 On November 11, 1917, “[f]orty-one 
woman suffragists from fifteen [s]tates were arrested . . . for picketing 
outside the White House.”89 The women arrived at Occoquan on 
November 15, 1917, and their arrival ushered in what suffragists would 
later call the “Night of Terror” at the prison, “during which most suffered 
physical injuries as a result of the beatings and rough treatment by the 
Occoquan guards.”90 
From the moment the women arrived at Occoquan, the guards man-
handled them, throwing them into dark, dirty cells with iron beds and open 
toilets that flushed only from outside the cell.91 The women were not 
provided food for nearly 24 hours.92 Neither the women’s attorney nor 
their family members were allowed visitation with the incarcerated 
suffragists.93 Many women began a hunger strike.94 In an effort to break 
the will and morale of the hunger strikers, the Occoquan officials isolated 
them from one another, interrogated them, informed them that no one 
82. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 108. 
83. Id. at 113. 
84. Id. at 114. 
85. Dodd, supra note 30, at 411. 
86. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 115. 
87. Id. at 118–19. 
88. Dodd, supra note 30, at 413. 
89. SALLY ROESCH WAGNER, THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 461 (2019). 
90. Dodd, supra note 30, at 413. See also WAGNER, supra note 89, at 339 (noting conditions
of “forced stripping, physical violence, shackling with manacles to prison bars, and threatened use of 
straightjackets and gags.”) (citing Accuse Jailors of Suffragists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1917, at 1). 
91. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 122–23. 
92. Id. at 124. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 124–26. 
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from the outside was paying any attention to them, lied to them by stating 
their attorney was no longer fighting the case, and instructed them that 
each of their compatriots had given up the fight.95 The women “suspected 
the lies and remained strong in their resistance.”96 
The women soon filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that their 
confinement to Occoquan was illegal because they were serving sentences 
imposed by the District of Columbia outside the confines of the district 
and the sentencing papers authorizing their imprisonment indicated they 
should be committed to the District Jail.97 On November 23, 1917, Judge 
Edmund Waddill of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia held a hearing on the prisoners’ writ.98 The women 
filed into the courtroom, “haggard, red-eyed, sick,” some too weak to 
walk to their seats, and some bearing “the marks of the attack on the ‘night 
of terror.’”99 Judge Waddill “felt alarmed by the writ’s description of the 
women’s treatment, calling it ‘bloodcurdling’ if true.”100 Ultimately, the 
judge found “that the suffragists had been illegally imprisoned at 
Occoquan (rather than the District Jail) and that they could be paroled on 
bail or finish their terms at the District Jail.”101 Twenty-two women chose 
to finish their sentences at the jail, and upon arrival, the women joined the 
collective hunger strike begun by the others already confined to the jail.102 
Faced with thirty hunger-striking women, the jail decided to release all of 
the women on November 27 and 28, 1917.103 Upon release, the women 
brought suit against the district commissioners, the warden of the District 
of Columbia jail, the superintendent of Occoquan, and a workhouse guard, 
requesting $800,000 in damages for the brutality they suffered during 
their terms of imprisonment, particularly on the “night of terror.”104 
Thereafter, as Congressional movement began on the Nineteenth 
Amendment, the women paused their picketing protests for a time.105 
When it became clear that the Senate would stall the Amendment’s 
passage, the women once again gathered at Lafayette Monument, directly 
across from the White House, with their banners in tow.106 District 
95. Id. at 126. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 127, 130. 
98. Id. at 128. 
99. Id. at 129. 
100.  ZHANISER & FRY, supra note 65, at 294. 
101.  Dodd, supra note 30, at 415 n.346. 
102.  STEVENS, supra note 24, at 130.  
103.  Id. at 129. 
104.  Id. at 131. 
105.  Id. at 137–40. 
106.  Id. at 141. 
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officials arrested 48 women at the protest, charged them with and 
convicted them of “holding a meeting in public grounds” and “climbing 
on a statue,” and sentenced them to 10 (for holding a public meeting) or 
15 (for climbing on a statue) days imprisonment.107 
To serve these sentences, district officials transported 26 women to 
an abandoned building that used to serve as a men’s workhouse until it 
“had been declared unfit for human habitation:”108 
This place was the worst the women had experienced. Hideous aspects 
which had not been encountered in the workhouse and jail were encoun-
tered here. The cells were damp and cold. The doors were partly of solid 
steel with only a small section grating, so that a very tiny amount of light 
penetrated the cells. The cots were of iron, without any spring and with 
only a thin straw pallet to lie upon. So frightful were the nauseating 
odors which permeated the place, and so terrible was the drinking water 
from the disused pipes, that one prisoner after another became violently 
ill.109 
All but two very elderly women declared a hunger strike upon arrival.110 
Within five days, district officials released the women.111 
In the months that followed, the women’s protests continued, and the 
district police made periodic arrests.112 With each arrest, conviction, and 
sentence, the women continued their practice of hunger striking in 
protest.113 
C. Official Responses to the Suffragists’ Protests 
Undoubtedly, the suffragists’ protest activities—both in and out of 
prison—helped advance the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. The 
National Woman’s Party experienced a dramatic increase in donations 
after the 1918 arrests and consequent exposure to the conditions in the 
Occoquan workhouse and the District of Columbia jail. On September 14, 
1917, a month after the second large set of suffragist prisoners arrived at 
Occoquan, Senator Andrieus A. Jones, the Chair of the Senate Committee 
on Woman Suffrage, visited Occoquan.114 The next day, the House of 
Representatives reported the Nineteenth Amendment out of committee, 
107.  Id. at 129. 
108.  Id.  
109.  Id. at 144. 
110.  Id.  
111.  Id.  
112.  See, e.g., id. at 162, 168, 172–73, 179. 
113.  Id. at 162. 
114.  Dodd, supra note 30, at 411. 
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and by September 24, 1917, the House “created a standing committee on 
suffrage.”115 By January 10, 1918, “exactly forty years to a day from the 
time the suffrage amendment was first introduced into Congress and 
exactly one year to a day from the time the first picket banner appeared at 
the gate of the White House,” the House of Representative passed the 
Amendment.116 While the fight to push the Amendment through the 
Senate lasted an additional year-and-a-half, officials never questioned the 
will of the suffragists to continue their protest strategy. By March 4, 1918, 
the D.C. Court of Appeals invalidated the picketers’ convictions.117 
The consequences of the suffragists’ staunch resistance to their 
unjust convictions and confinement extended beyond just advancing their 
cause. By evading Occoquan’s censorship, and later the District Jail’s 
controls, the suffragists’ surreptitious messages about life in the 
workhouse garnered press coverage118 and eventually led to a 
Congressional investigation into the conditions at Occoquan.119 Even the 
Wilson White House requested an inquiry into Occoquan’s conditions 
“after receiving one too many protest letters about the imprisoned 
suffragists’ plight.”120 While the President’s secretary and right-hand man 
confirmed the women’s poor treatment, the President rejected this 
opinion, instead tasking a district commissioner with the assignment of 
preparing an investigative report on prison conditions.121 The 
commissioner “did little more than interview the prison officials,” and the 
report ultimately kowtowed to political pressure, but the inquiry 
nonetheless brought a small amount of transparency to the prison that had 
theretofore been lacking.122 
115.  Id. 
116.  STEVENS, supra note 24, at 137–40. 
117.  Hunter v. Dist. of Columbia, 47 App. D.C. 406, 410 (1918). 
118.  ZHANISER & FRY, supra note 65, at 370 (noting that a New York Tribune reporter called 
for an impartial investigation related to the treatment).  
119.  STEVENS, supra note 24, at 98. 
120.  ZHANISER & FRY, supra note 65, at 288. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Dodd, supra note 30, at 413–14; see also ZHANISER & FRY, supra note 65, at 288. 
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRISON123
Ostensibly, there is no barrier separating prisoners from the 
protections afforded by the Constitution.124 However, prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights are limited while incarcerated because, once behind 
the prison walls, a prisoner holds only “‘those First Amendment rights 
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penal objectives of the correctional system.’”125 While the constitutional 
test that governs restrictions on prisoners’ First Amendment rights (the 
Turner standard) is not meant to be toothless, “regulations founded on 
flimsy rationales get upheld frequently enough, and the reasoning is often 
poor enough” that scholars and litigants are left wondering whether the 
standard has any bite.126 “[Prisoners] are denied reading material deemed 
objectionable by their captors, exposed to retaliation for expressing 
opinions at odds with those of their jailers, refused access to the news 
media, punished for possessing ‘radical’ views, and rewarded for 
renouncing them.”127 “Even a prisoner who has no desire to obtain, 
distribute, or even discuss anything objectionable faces grave 
impediments in pursuing his or her own intellectual star, however 
 123.  In this section, I focus on how the Supreme Court has analyzed First Amendment claims 
brought under a free speech theory. In so doing, I purposefully limit my analysis of prisoner protest 
activities to activities undertaken by individuals, not as part of a larger, organized group. Prisoners’ 
associational rights have been significantly curtailed by the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Jones 
v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
In Jones, the Supreme Court upheld a North Carolina prison policy that prohibited prisoners from 
joining the North Carolina prisoners’ union, holding union meetings, and restricted correspondence 
related to union activities. Id. at 122. The union sought to improve prison conditions and “to serve as 
a vehicle for the presentation and resolution of [prisoner] grievances.” Id. The Court held that the 
prison policy was a legitimate restriction on prisoners’ First Amendment right to association and 
chastised the lower court for failing to give appropriate deference to prison officials’ beliefs about the 
dangers arising from the union’s existence. Id. at 125–26, 130. This holding provided a preview for 
the built-in deference to prison officials that would later embody First Amendment jurisprudence 
regarding prisoners, as discussed below. There are many criticisms that can be made of the Jones 
case, but such criticisms are largely outside the purview of this piece. See, e.g., Andrea C. Armstrong, 
Racial Origins of Doctrines Limiting Prisoner Protest Speech, 60 HOW. L.J. 221, 248–60 (2016). In 
a forthcoming piece, I turn my focus to Jones to examine how the historical example of the Silent 
Sentinels’ in-prison protests supports a reexamination of the deference afforded prison officials in 
relation to prisoners’ associational and petition rights. See Nicole B. Godfrey, ‘Inciting a Riot’: Silent 
Sentinels, Group Protests, and Prisoners’ Petition and Associational Rights, 43 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. __ (forthcoming Nov. 2020). 
 124.  Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
84 (1987)) (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.”). 
125.  Armstrong, supra note 123, at 223 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 
126.  Shapiro, supra note 23, at 988.  
127.  Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, Silencing the Oppressed: No Freedom of Speech 
for Those Behind the Walls, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1005, 1005 (1993).  
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innocuous. A plethora of prison regulations, designed to facilitate prison 
administration, impose formidable restrictions of a prisoner’s access to 
ideas and information.”128 
The Supreme Court announced the standard governing a prisoner’s 
First Amendment free speech claim in the 1987 Supreme Court decision 
Turner v. Safley.129 In this section, I explain and examine the Turner 
standard before turning to the well-documented criticisms of Turner’s 
application in the three-plus decades since the decision. After gaining an 
understanding of the First Amendment’s application in prison, we’ll turn 
back to the example of the Silent Sentinels to add to the chorus of 
criticisms against Turner, focusing particularly on the importance of 
protecting prisoner protest and curbing some of the deference afforded 
prison officials under the Turner test. 
A. Turner v. Safley and Deference to Prison Officials 
For more than a century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
federal courts refused to entertain claims challenging prison conditions.130 
Unwilling to disturb internal prison management, the federal courts took 
a “hands-off” approach to the nation’s prisons and jails.131 With the dawn 
of the civil rights movement and its concerted efforts on effectuating 
change through the judicial system, the federal courts began recognizing 
federal remedies for constitutional violations challenged under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.132 With this recognition, federal courts also began allowing
prisoners to sue prison officials for unconstitutional prison conditions.133 
While the prison walls do not separate prisoners from constitutional 
protections, the Supreme Court has always reminded prisoners that they 
retain limited constitutional rights once they enter the prison gates.134 
Nevertheless, for many years, the federal courts subjected certain First 
Amendment violations by prison officials (e.g., those related to 
128.  Id. at 1018–19. 
129.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  
130.  Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 151, 165 (2019). 
131.  Id. (citing Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865–1965, in THE 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval 
Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995)). 
 132.  Id. See also Nicole B. Godfrey, Holding Federal Prison Officials Accountable: The Case 
for Recognizing a Damages Remedy for Federal Prisoners’ Free Exercise Claims, 96 NEB. L. REV. 
924, 931–32 (2018). 
 133.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (allowing a Muslim prisoner to 
challenge prison policies restricting his access to religious leaders of his faith). 
134.  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
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restrictions on correspondence) to a more exacting standard of review.135 
But, as the prison population exploded in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the federal courts began seeing an increasing number of lawsuits 
challenging prison conditions.136 This increase in prisoner suits—even 
unsuccessful cases—caused prison officials to focus on how “to avoid 
judicial intrusions into their domain.”137 
In Turner, prison officials successfully argued that prison officials 
should be afforded substantial deference by the federal courts when 
considering whether prison policies violate prisoners’ constitutional 
rights.138 Turner involved Leonard Safley’s challenge to two prison 
regulations promulgated by the Missouri Department of Corrections.139 In 
the early 1980s, Mr. Safley lived in the Renz Correctional Institution in 
Cedar City, Missouri, a prison that confined both male and female 
prisoners.140 Mr. Safley fell in love with a female prisoner named P. J. 
Watson, and the two developed a romantic relationship.141 When the 
prison officials at Renz learned about the relationship, they transferred 
Mr. Safley to another prison pursuant to policy.142 After his transfer, Mr. 
Safley attempted to send letters to Ms. Watson, who remained at Renz, 
and the two requested to marry one another.143 The superintendent at 
Renz, however, instituted policies that (1) prohibited correspondence 
between prisoners at other institutions unless the prisoners were related or 
involved in the same legal matter and (2) discouraged marriages between 
two prisoners.144 Mr. Safley sued Bill Turner, Renz’s superintendent, and 
 135.  See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412–13 (1974) (requiring that the regulation 
or practice “further a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” 
and “the limitation of First Amendment freedoms . . . be no greater than necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest involved.”). 
 136.  Cf. William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits 
in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 626–27 (1979) (noting the increase in prison population 
but concluding that prison population is “by no means determinative” of the volume of prisoner 
lawsuits). 
137.  Id. at 639. 
 138.  Brief for Petitioners, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (No. 85-1384), 1988 WL 
1026291, at *30 (arguing that the district court’s use of the least restrictive alternatives test failed to 
“give the appropriate deference to the decisions made by the correctional officers in light of their 
legitimate security and rehabilitation concerns.”).  
139.  David L. Hudson, Jr., Turner v. Safley: High Drama, Enduring Precedent, FREEDOM F. 
INST. (May 1, 2008), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2008/05/01/turner-v-safley-high-
drama-enduring-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/562L-W8EA]. 
140.  Id. at 139. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. (“Prison policy provided that when a male and female [prisoner] entered into a close or 
physical relationship one of the two [prisoners] would be transferred.”). 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
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other prison officials, claiming that the correspondence and marriage 
policies violated his First Amendment rights.145 
After Mr. Safley filed suit, a lawyer entered the case on his behalf, 
and amended the complaint to seek class certification on behalf of Mr. 
Safley and similarly situated prisoners.146 The district court, after an 
evidentiary hearing, entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law invalidating both policies as infringing the constitutional rights of the 
prisoner class.147 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that 
correspondence between prisoners “is not presumptively dangerous nor 
inherently inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives” and that 
the marriage rule as applied by Superintendent Turner was 
unconstitutional on its face because it provided no alternative means of 
exercising the right to marry.148 The Supreme Court affirmed in part and 
reversed in part and, in so doing, announced a new test through which 
federal courts should examine First Amendment claims brought by 
prisoners.149 
The new test announced by the Turner Court includes four factors.150 
The first factor, which Professor David Shapiro aptly dubbed the “heart” 
of the Turner standard,151 requires the court to examine whether there is a 
“‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate government interest put forward to justify it.”152 Oftentimes, 
this factor alone is dispositive in Turner cases—if the prison system can 
come forward with any legitimate government interest to justify the 
regulation, even if that interest is not the actual reason the prison system 
enacted the policy, the prisoner loses.153 The second factor requires a 
federal court to examine whether there are alternative means for the 
prisoner to exercise the right at issue, and the third factor compels the 
court to assess how accommodating the right at issue might impact prison 
145.  Id.  
146.  Id. 
147.  Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 590–96 (W.D. Mo. 1984).  
148.  Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1313–14 (8th Cir. 1985). 
149.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91, 93, 99 (1987). 
150.  Id. at 89–91. 
151.  Shapiro, supra note 23, at 982. 
152.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
153.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 532–33 (2006) (acknowledging that the Court was 
not balancing the Turner factors in this particular instance, but instead focusing on whether the prison 
officials “show[] more than simply a logical relation, that is, whether [they] show a reasonable 
relation.”). Nonetheless, “[w]hile the first factor is widely recognized as the most important,” some 
appellate courts have criticized lower courts for not considering all four factors at summary judgment. 
Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 259 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657 
(7th Cir. 2004) and Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 427 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
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guards, other prisoners, and the general allocation of prison resources.154 
Finally, the final factor forces the court to look at whether “obvious, easy 
alternatives” exist that allow for the exercise of the right at issue while 
still protecting the governmental interest asserted.155 
In articulating this test, the Turner Court emphasized that the test was 
driven by a perceived need to grant deference to prison officials: 
Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires 
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are 
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches 
of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been 
committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of 
powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state pe-
nal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to ac-
cord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.156 
After Turner, the Supreme Court has never found a prison policy to violate 
a prisoner’s First Amendment rights, and any prisoner seeking to 
challenge a prison regulation on First Amendment grounds certainly faces 
an uphill battle.157 Despite the lack of successful challenges to prison 
policies under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has long 
maintained that Turner’s “reasonableness standard is not toothless.”158 It 
may be that the Court does not mean Turner to be toothless, but as many 
commentators have recognized, “decisions by the lower federal courts 
sometimes render it so.”159 
154.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
155.  Id. at 90–91. 
156.  Id. at 84–85. 
157.  See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 347, 349–50 (1987) (upholding New 
Jersey prison policy forbidding prisoners with outside work assignments from returning to prison for 
Jumu’ah services on Fridays); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403–04 (upholding Federal 
Bureau of Prisons’ policy that allowed the warden to refuse to deliver a publication received in the 
mail to a prisoner if the warden determined the publication was “detrimental to the security, good 
order, or discipline of the institution, or if it might facilitate criminal activity.”); Overton v. Bazzetta, 
539 U.S. 126, 128–131, 133–34, 137 (2003) (upholding Michigan prison policies that banned contact 
visits for prisoners considered the most dangerous, banned visits from children who were not 
immediate family members, and banned all visitors except for attorneys and clergy for prisoners with 
multiple substance abuse violations); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525–26, 530–32 (upholding 
Pennsylvania policy that prohibited phone calls (except in emergencies), visits (except one each 
month), and newspapers and magazines for prisoners confined to the Long Term Segregation Unit, 
meant to hold approximately forty prisoners deemed the “most incorrigible, recalcitrant” prisoners in 
the state). 
 158.  Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 524, 547 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414). 
159.  Shapiro, supra note 23, at 988. 
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B. Criticisms of Turner’s Deference 
Since the Supreme Court announced its decision in Turner, the 
decision has been appropriately criticized in student notes and 
comments160 and by legal scholars.161 The central theme found in almost 
all criticisms levied against the Turner standard is that the deference 
afforded prison officials goes too far. 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky turns the Court’s assumption that it 
must defer to prison officials on its head, arguing that authoritarian 
institutions like prisons “are the places where aggressive judicial review 
is most essential.”162 Chemerinsky provides two interrelated reasons for 
this argument: (1) prisons and other authoritarian institutions are, by their 
 160.  See, e.g., Owen Rarric, Kirsh v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections: Will the Supreme 
Court Say “Hands Off” Again?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 305, 319 (2002) (arguing that Turner deference 
“results in a manipulated application” of the standard “because it allows courts to find a ‘reasonable 
security concern’ based upon mere speculation.”) (quoting Roth, infra note 160, at 686); Cheryl Dunn 
Giles, Turner v. Safley and its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-off” Doctrine, 35 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 219, 236 (1993) (criticizing Turner for failing to give sufficient weight to clearly identified 
alternatives to the regulation at issue); William Mark Roth, Turner v. Safley: The Supreme Court 
Further Confuses Prisoners’ Constitutional Rights, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 667, 714 (1989) (criticizing 
Turner’s deference for allowing “evidence based on mere speculation”); Lorijean Golichowski Dei, 
The New Standard of Review for Prisoners’ Rights: A “Turner” for the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 
393, 436 (1988) (arguing that Turner’s focus on deference robs the standard “of most of its bite.”); 
Matthew P. Blishcak, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners’ Religious Free Exercise 
Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 486 (1988) (criticizing the Court’s extension of Turner to free exercise 
claims, thereby creating a constitutional standard for those claims “that relies heavily on the discretion 
of prison administrators.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., Evan Bianchi & David Shapiro, Locked Up, Shut Up: Why Speech in Prison 
Matters, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 28 (2018) (arguing that the costs of deference are severe because 
unfettered deference takes prisoner speech out of the discourse of American ideas, a result contrary 
to the values inherent to the First Amendment); Shapiro, supra note 23, at 988–1005 (arguing that the 
need for deference is overstated and a higher standard of review could still adequately protect the 
interests of prison officials); Clay Calvert & Kara Carnley Murrhee, Big Censorship in the Big 
House—A Quarter-Century After Turner v. Safley: Muting Movies, Music & Books Behind Bars, 7 
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 257, 269 (2012) (arguing that “fears of violence and disruption of security 
within prisons largely fuel the deference granted prison officials when it comes to protecting the First 
Amendment free speech rights of prisoners.”); Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—
Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1666–68 (2007) (arguing that the premise that courts should defer to the 
professional judgment of prison officials “proves too much” and is “inconsistent with the heightened 
scrutiny typically applicable to government restrictions on individual rights.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 458 (1999); Kuby & 
Kunstler, supra note 127, at 1010 (arguing the idea that prison officials should be afforded deference 
on questions of free speech in prison is the equivalent of allowing the governor to silence the 
governed); Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, False Teeth? Thornburg’s Claim That Turner’s Standard for 
Determining a Prisoner’s First Amendment Rights Is Not “Toothless”, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 527, 543 
(1990) (arguing that as applied challenges to prison regulations should be accorded less deference 
than facial challenges). 
162.  Chemerinsky, supra note 161, at 458. 
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very nature, the “places where serious abuses of power and violations of 
rights are likely to occur;”163 and (2) prisoners, who are “routinely and 
permanently disenfranchised,” lack the political power to effectuate 
change to their circumstances through other democratic means.164 
Moreover, Professor Chemerinsky argues that deference to prisons is not 
absolutely necessary.165 
Radical lawyers Ronald Kuby and William Kunstler similarly take 
issue with the idea that authoritarian institutions should be able to police 
speech levied against them.166 To Kuby and Kunstler: 
The notion that the judgments of prison administrators are entitled to 
wide-ranging deference is a concept utterly alien and antithetical to the 
rest of First Amendment jurisprudence. Prison administrators are the 
persons who are least likely to be trusted with the power to censor [pris-
oners]. It is they who feel the lash of prisoners’ freedom of speech most 
keenly; it is they who are called to task when corruption and brutality 
are exposed. The idea that governors, by virtue of their role as gover-
nors, should have the power to silence the governed is absurd in any 
other context but penal institutions.167 
They point out that “[p]rison administrators differ widely in background, 
education, skills, and social attitudes,” and, therefore, prison officials do 
not have “some mysterious expertise that requires deference from the 
federal courts.”168 
Professor Scott Moss agrees. He argues that deference to prisons 
(like deference to public schools and employers’ decisions in employment 
discrimination cases) fails to account for the expertise judges have in the 
criminal justice system, the limited scope of judicial review in any case, 
and the incentives for parties to fully develop their litigation position to 
ensure a full and fair adjudication of the merits of constitutional claims.169 
In furtherance of Moss’ idea that federal courts should value a full 
and fair adjudication of the merits of constitutional claims, Professor 
David Shapiro argues that it is time for the Supreme Court to revisit 
Turner in light of the lessons learned by its application over the past 30-
plus years.170 In particular, Shapiro argues that the Supreme Court should 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. at 458–60. 
165.  Id. at 460–61. 
166.  Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 127, at 1024. 
167.  Id.  
168.  Id. at 1023. 
169.  Moss, supra note 161, at 1666–67. 
170.  Shapiro, supra note 23, at 1026. 
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remodel judicial review of prisoner speech claims in light of the 
substantial success achieved by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act “in 
expanding protection of prisoners’ expression without compromising 
institutional safety.”171 Indeed, Shapiro points to the spotty record of the 
lower federal courts in Turner cases and calls on the Supreme Court to 
make clear “that deference does not mean the abandonment of review.”172 
Such a call is supported by the research of Professor Clay Calvert 
and Kara Carnley Murrhee, who analyzed eight federal court decisions 
issued between 2010 and 2011 that impacted prisoners’ access to 
media.173 From this exhaustive analysis, Calvert and Murrhee conclude 
that Turner’s deference is often fueled and expanded by judicial fear, not 
by rigorous application of the standard to actual proof of harm caused by 
the speech at issue.174 Calvert and Murrhee take particular issue with the 
burden-shifting result of Turner: 
Furthermore, under the Turner framework, judicial “deference not only 
lightens the government’s burden of justifying a speech restriction, but 
actually shifts the burden back to the speech plaintiff. On the question 
of proof of harm allegedly caused by speech, this burden shifting has the 
rather perverse result of requiring [a prisoner] to demonstrate lack of 
causation while assuming that the speech prison officials seek to censor 
causes harm. Put more bluntly, the burden on the plaintiff-[prisoner] is 
to prove a negative. How a plaintiff behind bars might accomplish this 
task boggles the mind, even if he or she was a social scientist capable of 
designing and performing experiments behind bars.175 
According to Calvert and Murrhee, then, the standard has been rendered 
“toothless,” and “unless a [prisoner’s] case involves particularly 
outrageous facts or happens to be assigned to a pro-free speech jurist who 
refuses to grant expansive deference to prison officials, there is very little 
hope of a First Amendment triumph under Turner today.”176 
This lack of judicial oversight of prisoner speech undercuts the 
values upon which First Amendment jurisprudence has developed.177 
Thus, “the costs of deference are quite severe.”178 By failing to protect 
171.  Id. at 1027. 
172.  Id. at 1026. 
173.  Calvert & Murrhee, supra note 161, at 269–93. 
174.  Id. at 295. 
175.  Id. at 294; see Moss, supra note 161, at 1659 (emphasis added). 
176.  Calvert & Murrhee, supra note 161, at 296. 
177.  Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 161, at 28. 
178.  Id. 
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prisoners’ free speech rights, the federal courts enable prison systems to 
undercut core First Amendment values and to curtail democratic 
participation by the more than 2.2 million people incarcerated today.179 
The next section turns back to the example of the Silent Sentinels to 
examine how the Silent Sentinels’ in-prison protest furthered the values 
underlying the First Amendment and why the federal courts should re-
examine Turner to ensure prisoners’ are afforded adequate protections for 
protest speech. 
IV. IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING PRISONER PROTEST
As discussed in the introduction to this piece, the American prison 
has become known as a place of unspeakable violence and inhumanity, 
wherein prisoners are: 
placed in cells with human waste and subjected to the screams of psy-
chiatric patients; [] forced to sleep for two months, despite repeated 
complaints, on a concrete floor in a cramped cell with a mentally ill 
HIV-prisoner who urinates on [them]; [subjected to treatment like] urine 
thrown at [them] by a guard which splashed on [their] face and shirt.180 
Despite these horrors occurring daily in the nation’s prisons and jails, 
federal courts often largely defer to prison administrators in claims 
alleging constitutional violations, thereby allowing rights’ violations to go 
unchecked for decades. I submit that by strengthening the protections 
afforded to prisoner speech, and particularly prisoner protest speech, we 
can further the values enshrined in the First Amendment and allow 
prisoners to join the current conversation about criminal justice reform—
reform that impacts their lives much more than the politicians and pundits 
currently pushing or opposing such reform. 
In this section, I use the example of the in-prison protests staged by 
the Silent Sentinels to examine how those protests furthered three 
interrelated First Amendment values. But before moving further into a 
discussion of how the experience of the Silent Sentinels’ in-prison protest 
provide a compelling example as to why prisoner protest should be 
afforded greater protections than current First Amendment jurisprudence 
allows, I must pause to comment on the limitations of this example. First, 
the women arrested and jailed in connection with the picketing campaign 
179.  Id.  
 180.  Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
115, 134 (2008) (citing Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 717–20 (5th Cir. 1999); Watts v. Gatson, 
No. 97-0114-CB-M, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6593, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1999); Fackler v. Dillard, 
No. 06-10466, 2006 WL 2404498, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 7, 2006)).  
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were white, wealthy, educated, and often married to men who were 
politically and socially well-connected. Thus, the lived reality of these 
women is starkly different than the lived reality of most of today’s 
prisoners, who are largely non-white, poor, uneducated, and without 
political or social connections. Therefore, the suffragist prisoners’ voices 
garnered more empathy and credibility than most prisoners’ voices garner 
today. Second, part of the outpouring of sympathy that accompanied the 
initial arrests was grounded in the undoubtedly racist views that the 
suffragist prisoners should not be forced to live in Occoquan’s 
desegregated environment.181 Finally, the suffragist prisoners were jailed 
on what most people likely viewed as bogus charges, while many (but 
certainly not all, or even most) prisoners incarcerated today are serving 
time on more serious charges. While each of these limitations highlights 
the stark differences between the suffragist prisoners and the men and 
women incarcerated in our nation’s prisons and jails today, I submit the 
example still provides utility in examining how First Amendment values 
are honored by affording protection for prisoners’ individual protest 
speech in the ways outlined below. 
The First Amendment values I focus on in the remainder of this 
section are: (1) the value of promoting democracy by checking the power 
of the captors; (2) the value of expanding the marketplace of ideas by 
highlighting the importance of democratic participation and fighting for 
their voices to be heard both inside and outside the prison walls to promote 
transparency of opaque institutions; and (3) the value of promoting 
individual identity and autonomy by not allowing their status as prisoners 
to distract them from their fundamental purpose: to secure the vote for all 
women. From there, I turn to examples of modern prisoner protests, 
highlighting both the risks inherent to engaging in such protest for the 
prisoners involved and the rewards earned by those protests that garner 
sufficient public attention to change the conditions inside the nation’s 
prisons. 
A. First Amendment Values and the Silent Sentinels’ In-Prison Protest 
“The fundamental purpose of the first amendment was to guarantee 
the maintenance of an effective system of free expression”182 for every 
person. While scholars have grappled with why the freedoms enshrined in 
the First Amendment merit special protection throughout the life of the 
181.  See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 30, at 407, n.299. 
 182.  Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 
878 (1963).  
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republic, it seems clear that any justification for these particularized 
constitutional protections is grounded in a view that values individual 
participation in democratic governance.183 Professor Marc O. DeGirolami 
has distilled the justifications for the protections afforded in the First 
Amendment into three overlapping purposes. First, the First Amendment 
is meant to promote democratic values by holding government power in 
check.184 Second, allowing for contributions from all voices expands the 
marketplace of ideas to further a societal quest for the truth.185 Finally, the 
protections afforded by the First Amendment allow for the promotion of 
individual identity and autonomy.186 
1. Checking Power and Promoting Democratic Values
The first value highlighted by DeGirolami recognizes the importance 
of “free discourse” to a healthy, limited, liberal democratic government.187 
Under this justification, First Amendment freedoms are necessary to hold 
the government to account for abusive conduct and to limit the 
government’s imposition of a certain morality on the polity:188 
Free speech rights are also cherished as a vaccination against tyranny 
and abuse of government power. Underlying this ‘checking value’ is the 
well-founded suspicion that every government has a natural tendency to 
suppress the unpopular and maintain the status quo. Within a prison, the 
hand of the government is far heavier and more frequently involved in 
one’s daily affairs than outside the walls. The potential for abuse when 
one has complete control over other people needs little explanation.189 
Because prison provides an environment ripe for unchecked abuse, 
extending greater protection to prisoner speech necessarily furthers this 
First Amendment purpose. 
From the start, the suffragists clearly recognized the potential their 
protests had to promote democratic values. “The rhetorical framing during 
the picketing campaign . . . centered on very abstract but emotionally 
 183.  Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1465, 1470 (2016).  
184.  Id.  
185.  Id. at 1470–71. 
186.  Id. at 1472. 
187.  Id. (quoting KENT GREENWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND 
LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 6 (1995)). 
 188.  DeGirolami, supra note 183, at 1470–71 (citing, inter alia, Vincent Blasi, The Checking 
Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977) and JAMES MADISON, 
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in RELIGION 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 51, 51 (Michael. W. McConnell et al. eds., 2011)). 
189.  Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 127, at 1021. 
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resonant ideals: democratic legitimacy, self-determination, and 
liberty.”190 The suffragists understood from the start of the picketing 
campaign that by highlighting the hypocrisy of President Wilson’s 
promotion of democratic values abroad while denying full democratic 
participation at home, they could check the administration’s ability to 
garner support for his war efforts.191 By engaging in unruly constitutional 
citizenship, the suffragists were able to highlight the injustice of their 
plight once arrested. 
Upon arrest, when prison officials began denying the suffragist 
prisoners their most basic privileges, the women understood that they had 
little power to change their plight on their own. But they also understood 
they could harness the power of public opinion to force the hand of their 
captors.192 In this way, they used the tools available to them—the power 
to petition—to garner publicity to “turn the wheel of public opinion.”193 
The suffragist prisoners obviously saw their in-prison protests as part 
of their larger movement to become fully participating members of 
democratic society through the right to vote. 
Soon after her release on November 27, [Alice] Paul sent out a press 
statement praising the picketing campaign: “How is it that people fail to 
see our fight as part of the great American struggle for democracy, a 
struggle since the days of the Pilgrims? We are bearing on the American 
tradition, living up to the American spirit.”194 
Today, we punish people by not only depriving them of their liberty but 
also—in almost every state—by disenfranchising them (sometimes 
forever). By ensuring that prisoner protest rights are protected, we afford 
prisoners a way to continue to participate in democracy—albeit in a much 
more limited manner than by exercising the right to vote. 
190.  Dodd, supra note 30, at 407.  
191.  Id. at 400. 
192.  Id. 
193.  NEUMAN, supra note 49, at 150. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the suffragist 
prisoners—in writing and circulating their petition—were acting within the confines of the proscribed 
written rules. They certainly were not, as evidenced by the necessity of smuggling the petition out of 
the Occoquan, supra at Part I.B., and the immediate and apparent retaliation the prisoners 
experienced, id. Nor do I mean to suggest that the First Amendment jurisprudence at the time would 
have given the prisoners legal cover for their actions—it would not. Nonetheless, the suffragist 
prisoners’ activities provide a compelling example as to why prisoners should be afforded the 
opportunity to engage in protest activities meant to draw attention to their in-prison plight. 
194.  Dodd, supra note 30, at 415. 
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2. Expanding the Marketplace of Ideas
The second value protected by the First Amendment that Professor 
DeGiorlami describes is the “Millian idea of rivalry among ideas as an 
avenue to truth.”195 This purpose views First Amendment protections as a 
way to protect the “free trade in ideas” in order to steadily progress toward 
ethical and political truths.196 
Prisoners have no lesser need for the truth than free citizens, nor is the 
truth ascertained differently behind prison walls than across the street 
from them. Indeed, if one proceeds from the assumption that persons are 
in prison because they have erred in some way, then granting them the 
same tools possessed by the rest of us to search for truth is an unques-
tionable penological good.197 
In this era of criminal justice reform, as the nation struggles to determine 
how best to address the crisis of mass incarceration, it is critical that the 
voices of those most affected by the crisis are heard. Extending greater 
protection to prisoner speech would further these ends. 
While the suffragist prisoners did not aim to reform the prisons in 
which they were housed, they did inspire public officials to take a closer 
look at what was happening inside the walls of Occoquan. For a brief 
moment in time, then, the suffragist prisoners made the conditions of 
Occoquan more transparent and exposed the truth of those conditions to 
members of the public. In this way, the suffragists contributed to the 
marketplace of ideas in two ways relevant to our inquiry. First, the 
suffragist prisoners increased transparency. Second, this increase in 
transparency opened the door for public officials to investigate and reform 
prison conditions. 
Ultimately, the investigations spurred by the suffragists in-prison 
protests amounted to nothing more than pro forma reports not meant to 
produce meaningful change, and the public quickly forgot the plight of 
the prisoners still confined to Occoquan after the suffragists secured 
release. But, the takeaway for today’s prisoners is two-fold. First, by 
better protecting prisoners’ First Amendment rights, we can increase 
 195.  DeGirolami, supra note 183, at 1471 (citing John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE BASIC 
WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 3, 35 (2002)) (“No one can be a great thinker who does not 
recognize, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may 
lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for 
himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves 
to think.”). 
 196.  DeGirolami, supra note 183, at 1471–72 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
197.  Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 127, at 1021. 
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transparency of the prisons and jails that confine more than 2.2 million 
people in this country by listening to and investigating prisoners’ 
complaints about their conditions. Second, by amplifying and protecting 
prisoners’ voices, we lend credibility to their stories and allow them to 
participate meaningfully in the conversations about criminal justice 
reform occurring today. Right now, we’re experiencing a moment where 
politicians on both sides of the aisle are taking a critical look at criminal 
justice reform. But often the voices of those impacted most by the criminal 
justice system—those imprisoned within it who can describe its hard 
truths—are not given full weight or even heard in the political process. By 
providing greater protections for those voices, they can join the 
conversation. Without those voices, “in the aggregate, people who are 
richer, whiter, and not incarcerated, will enjoy greater access to the 
marketplace of ideas,” resulting in “a distorted mixture of viewpoints in 
public discourse because demographic factors correlate with viewpoints 
on at least some matters of public concern, especially ones involving 
criminal justice.”198 
3. Advancing Individual Identity and Autonomy
Finally, the third justification for the freedoms enshrined by the First 
Amendment, as identified by DeGirolami, “focuses on the importance of 
expressive and religious freedom for individual identity.”199 This 
justification “is canonical for the conventional account of the First 
Amendment”200 and speaks “to the essence of what it meant to be a human 
person.”201 By dehumanizing prisoners, we make it easier to ignore their 
plight. The suffragist prisoners recognized this dehumanization and also 
acknowledged the difficulties inherent to maintaining protest activities 
when subjected to retaliation: “however gaily you start out in prison to 
keep up a rebellious protest, it is nevertheless a terribly difficult thing to 
do in the face of the constant cold and hunger of undernourishment.”202 
By strengthening prisoners’ ability to express themselves and demonstrate 
their own identities, we can further this final First Amendment value. 
198.  Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 161, at 20. 
199.  DeGirolami, supra note 183, at 1472. 
200.  Id. at 1473. 
201.  Id. 
202.  ZHANISER & FRY, supra note 65, at 284. 
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B. Modern Prisoner Protest 
Despite the lack of protections afforded to them under the First 
Amendment, many prisoners today still engage in forms of non-violent 
protest meant to draw attention to their plight.203 In recent years, prisoners 
have engaged in silent protests,204 work stoppages,205 and hunger 
strikes206 as a means to protest unconstitutional prison conditions. 
Oftentimes, the act of engaging in these forms of protest results in 
disciplinary punishment, “which can affect everything from [prisoner] 
classification to privileges to parole.”207 Under Turner, drafting, 
circulating, and signing petitions and engaging in work stoppages are not 
necessarily protected speech.208 Whether engaging in a hunger strike is 
protected speech depends on where a prisoner is incarcerated: while the 
Fifth Circuit has found that hunger strikes might “constitute protected 
activity in certain circumstances,” a federal court in Illinois reached the 
opposite conclusion.209 
Even protected speech is often meaningless under Turner. Prisoners 
may describe unfavorable prison conditions to family and friends on the 
outside, but without political capital or the resources to find help to rectify 
those conditions, there is little those family and friends can do.210 
Prisoners may also attempt to challenge unconstitutional conditions in the 
courts but will face a number of formidable barriers to doing so, largely 
because of what David Shapiro calls “‘practical immunity’—effective 
insulation from suit that flows partly from formal immunity doctrines 
(such as absolute or qualified immunity) but primarily from other 
obstacles that insulate potential defendants from suit.”211 Such obstacles 
203.  Armstrong, supra note 123, at 226. 
204.  Id. at 228. 
205.  Id. at 226; see also German Lopez, America’s prisoners are going on strike in at least 17 
states, VOX (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/17/17664048/national-prison-strike-2018 
[https://perma.cc/LQW5-AABK]. 
 206.  Aviva Stahl, Force-Feeding is Cruel, Painful, and Degrading—and American Prisons 
Won’t Stop, NATION (Jun. 4, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/force-feeding-prison-
supermax-torture/ [https://perma.cc/A2CL-QEL5]; Josh Harkinson & Maggie Caldwell, 50 Days 
Without Food: The California Prison Hunger Strike Explained, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 27, 2013), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/50-days-california-prisons-hunger-strike-explainer/ 
[https://perma.cc/E7D8-XJAT].  
207.  Armstrong, supra note 123, at 222. 
208.  Id. at 224. 
209.  Id. at 230 (citing Stefanoff v. Hays Cty., 154 F.3d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1998); Birdo v. Dave 
Gomez, No. 13-cv-6864, 2016 WL 6070173, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016)). 
210.  Id. at 229–30. 
211.  Shapiro, supra note 23, at 1013. 
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include a lack of access to counsel212 and limitations imposed by the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act.213 Thus, while some prisoners choose to 
engage in protest speech, they do so at tremendous risk of punishment and 
with little options available for meaningful, legal protest activity. 
Some prisoner protest activity, however, has eventually led to 
meaningful reforms of prison conditions. For example, in 2011 and 2013, 
thousands of prisoners confined in Special Housing Units (SHUs) in 
California’s prisons engaged in hunger strikes demanding relief from the 
brutal SHU conditions.214 Garnering the attention of the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, an organization “dedicated to advancing and 
protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” the hunger-striking prisoners 
eventually formed the class challenging indeterminate solitary 
confinement in California.215 The case settled in September 2015, but, in 
January 2019, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California determined that the constitutional violations continued and 
ordered an additional year of monitoring.216 While the case is ongoing, 
large-scale reforms to the California SHUs have occurred, in large part 
because of the initial in-prison protest. 
212.  Id. at 1013–19. 
 213.  Armstrong, supra note 123, at 231; see also Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, 
Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 139–40 (2008). 
214.  See Harkinson & Caldwell, supra note 206. 
215.  See Order Granting in Part Motion for Class Certification; Denying Motion to Intervene, 
Ashker v. Governor of California, No. C 09–5796 CW, 2014 WL 2465191, (N.D. Cal. Jun. 02, 2014) 
(No. 195, 233) (available at https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/
6.2.14%20Order%20Granting%20Class%20Cert.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6KF-XHNL]). 
 216.  See Order, Ashker v. Newsom, No. 09-cv-05796-CW (RMI), 2019 WL 330461 (N.D. Cal. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his 
human quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect 
does not cease to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his 
yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is his quest for self-
realization concluded. If anything, the need for identity and self-respect 
are more compelling in the dehumanizing prison environment. Whether 
an O. Henry writing his short stories in a jail cell or a frightened young 
inmate writing his family, a prisoner needs a medium for self-
expression. It is the role of the First Amendment and this Court to 
protect those precious personal rights by which we satisfy the basic 
yearnings of the human spirit.217 
Despite the above flowery affirmation from the United States 
Supreme Court almost 45 years ago, the federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have largely spent the following decades narrowing the 
First Amendment protections afforded to prisoners, as outlined in detail 
above.218 By refusing to afford prisoners robust protections under the First 
Amendment, we are not only stripping prisoners of pieces of their identity, 
but we are ignoring two key values enshrined in the First Amendment: the 
ability of individual citizens to check the unadulterated power of their 
government and the promotion of democratic values through democratic 
participation. While prisoners, by virtue of their incarceration, are stripped 
of the most fundamental way to participate in democracy—the exercise of 
voting rights—prisoners are not stripped of their citizenship. Therefore, 
as citizens, they should retain the right to protest the exercise of abusive 
power in the opaquest of institutions: the American prison. Yet modern 
First Amendment law as applied to prisoners fails to ensure the protection 
of these basic values. 
This failure amplifies the societal harms caused by mass 
incarceration and the other abject miscarriages of justice that characterize 
our criminal justice system. The harms of mass incarceration are more 
acute when one accounts for the vastly disparate impact the criminal 
justice system has on communities of color.219 
217.  Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427–28 (1974).  
 218.  See generally Shapiro, supra note 23 (describing how the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision 
in Turner v. Safley gave lip-service to the idea that prisoners are not without constitutional protections 
behind the prison gates but, in the end, gave prisoners virtually no First Amendment protections).  
219.  Lindsey Webb, Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 125, 129 (2018).  
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There is a dramatic racial disparity in the United States’ criminal justice 
system, where African American people are incarcerated at 5.1 times the 
rate of whites, and Latino people at 1.4 times the rate of whites at the 
state level. In federal prisons, African American people constitute 38% 
of the incarcerated population—a percentage that is almost triple the 
proportion of African American people in the general population.220 
In addition to these racial disparities, the past quarter century has 
witnessed a 750% increase in the number of incarcerated women.221 Like 
the broader criminal justice system, women of color are imprisoned at a 
higher rate than white women.222 Thus, strengthening the First 
Amendment protections afforded to prisoners will not only have a net 
positive impact on both the conditions inside our nation’s prisons and jail 
but will also help ensure democratic participation for historically excluded 
and silenced groups. As the Silent Sentinels taught us, the voices of these 
groups must be heard. 
220.  Id. at 129–30. 
 221.  The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Incarcerated Women and Girls, at 1 (Jun. 06, 2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/incarcerated-women-and-girls/ 
[https://perma.cc/7E55-PSNV]. 
222.  Id. at 2. 
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